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O
n 2 August 1999, Britain’s largest selling tabloid The Sun,
owned and operated by Rupert Murdoch’s News Limited,
published an editorial which encapsulates the hype that has
emerged around the Internet since it became publicly available in
the early to mid-1990s:
“The Internet is delivering power to the people. At last, the
consumer is king. Communism has collapsed – but here is a force
that is truly taking power from the few and transferring it to the
many. It has happened in America. It will happen here [the UK].
Perfect information. Perfect democracy. Perfect competition.
New Regulatory Politics And
Communication Technologies
In Singapore
Terence Lee
Murdoch University, Western Australia
Singapore’s status as one of the most networked society in the Asia-
Pacific region is rarely disputed, though not much has been written
critically about the city-state’s approach towards the regulation of
information/communication technologies. This paper seeks therefore to
disambiguate the social, cultural, economic as well as the political
imperatives of such regulatory practices in Singapore. It begins by
looking at the development of Singapore’s Internet and info-
communications scene, with highlights of political responses to key
occurrences over the past decade. Taking on board the discourse of auto-
regulation – that regulating the Internet and new media in Singapore
is mostly about ensuring an automatic functioning of power for political
expedience and longevity – this paper offers new insights into the politics
of new communication technologies in Singapore, from its humble
beginnings of censorship, surveillance and ‘sleaze’ control (1990s) to
recent attempts at restricting information via new legislations governing
foreign media and the stifling of online political campaigning and debates
(from 2001/02). This paper concludes by looking at aspects of electronic
government (e-Government), suggesting how the offering of e-Citizen
services are likely to tighten Internet control in the future. It argues
that although electronic spaces for political engagement are and will be
limited, one needs to make full use of them whilst they are still available.5 AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
TERENCE LEE:  New regulatory politics ...
Choice for all” (The Sun, 2 August 1999; cited in Gibson & Ward,
2000b: 25).
The rapid expansion of digitalised and new communication
technologies had been heralded as having significant implications
for the improved functioning of democracy in general and politics
in particular. As a technology designed and founded on liberal
ideology and concepts of freedom of access and information, the
advent of the Internet brought about much hope and “power to the
people”, many of whom were – and still are – becoming socially,
economically and politically disenfranchised (see Lee & Birch, 2000).
Over the past decade, the opening up of electronic modes of
communication – including electronic mails (emails), websites,
mobile telephony and the ever-popular short messaging service
(SMS), as well as the rise of Electronic Government (E-Government)
services – have enabled citizens to become more involved in politics
and public administration. With the ability to access wider
information and the opening up of space for more voices,
“technologies such as the Internet are seen as offering potential for
bringing government closer to the people, making it more responsive
and relevant” (Gibson & Ward, 2000a: 1). Or in the words of
Chadwick (2001), with the Internet, governments around the world
have begun to put on an “electronic face”.
However, the blue-sky vision of The Sun editorial may have been
somewhat premature.  As Shapiro points out, the notion that the
Internet is inherently democratising is a myth that needs to be
debunked. Indeed, the ‘electronic face’ of technology and its design
will be at the heart of various power struggles in the digital age
(Shapiro, 1999: 14-5). As Shapiro warns:
“We should not be surprised to see governments and
corporations trying to shape the code of the Net to preserve their
authority or profitability. But code is not everything. Even if we could
lock in the democratic features of the Internet, the ultimate political
impact of [communication technologies] must be judged on more
than design. We must also consider the way a technology is used
and the social environment in which it is deployed” (Shapiro, 1999:
15).
Willy-nilly, the ‘perfect competition’ brought about by a
supposedly ‘perfect democracy’ is starting to resemble a potent
power struggle within the highly contentious sphere of politics. As
in off-line or pre-Internet politics, this struggle is mostly about
winning the hearts and minds of the citizen-electorate either directly
and openly or in a subtle fashion. To succeed, governments around
the world would need to be actively involved in shaping both the
design as well as the social environment in which the Internet and6 AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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other new media technologies operate.
Taking on board Shapiro’s advice, this paper sets out to
consider the way (and ways) in which new communication
technologies, led most prominently by the Internet, has been and
can be used within the context of the city-state of Singapore. With
labels such as ‘police state’ and ‘nanny state’ constantly heaped
on it, Singapore is well known – or to be precise, notorious – for
being a highly regulated society. With toilet-flushing and anti-
spitting rules, as well as laws banning the sale and distribution of
chewing gum, it is not too difficult to understand the rationale for
the many not-too-pleasing descriptions of Singapore’s social and
cultural environment. Indeed, much has been said about how the
Singapore polity resonates with a climate of fear, which gives rise
to the prevalent practice of self-censorship (Gomez, 2000;
Tremewan, 1994). Against such a backdrop, it would be interesting
to see how different groups in Singapore employ the Internet and
new media to find their voice and seek their desired ends, whether
these are social or political. Equally, if not more interesting, are
the ways in which the omnipresent People Action’s Party (PAP)
government responds.
Despite the somewhat restrictive socio-political  environment
in Singapore, its status as one of the most networked society in
the Asia-Pacific region is rarely disputed. This paper begins by
providing an update of Singapore as the ‘intelligent’ networked
island, using both statistical and anecdotal data. It then goes on to
discuss the policy discourse of auto-regulation advanced by this
author – that regulating the Internet and new media in Singapore
is mostly about ensuring a panoptical cum automatic functioning
of power for political expedience and longevity (Lee 2001a,b; see
also Lee & Birch, 2000).  It will suggest that the politics of new
communication technologies in Singapore is about the ongoing
struggle for power and legitimacy to control information flows (à
la Castells, 2000). From its humble beginnings of censorship,
surveillance and ‘sleaze’ control (1990s) to recent attempts (in 2001
and 2002) at restricting free flows of information via new
legislations governing foreign media and the stifling of online
political campaigning and debates, the Singaporean authorities
have sought to minimise spaces for political expressions via new
communication technologies. Although there are clear resistances
to such resurgences of hegemony, the increasingly global fears of
terrorism, caused largely by events of 11 September 2001, has
provided a strong rationale for the long-term sustenance of such
authoritarian practices. By examining possible uses – and abuses
– of the Internet in Singapore, this paper aims to make sense of
new communication technologies and its relationship to7 AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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democracy and political engagement in Singapore and beyond.
Singapore is undoubtedly one of the most well connected
societies not just within the Asia-Pacific region, but also globally.
Since the start of the new millennium, Singapore has attained the
status of ‘intelligent island’, with 99% of households and businesses
in the Central Business District (CBD) effectively connected to a
nationwide hybrid fibre-optic network. This network, the result of
a master plan entitled A Vision of an Intelligent Island: IT 2000 Report
(National Computer Board, 1992), not only enables the delivery of
both cable and must-carry free-to-air television channels via the
majority government-owned Starhub Cable Vision (SCV), it makes
every home ready for Singapore ONE, Singapore’s much-vaunted
broadband interactive site which promises a host of digital and
multimedia services, including ultra high-speed Internet access.
The Singapore government’s proclaimed aim is to turn the country
into an information technology (IT) hub so that it can be
transformed into a knowledge-based economy (Kuo et al, 2002).
Through agencies like the Info-communication (Infocomm)
Development Authority of Singapore (IDA) and the forthcoming
Media Development Authority (MDA), the government is
constantly implementing strategies to spread and speed-up the use
of computers in everyday life (Kuo et al, 2002). It is believed that
for Singapore to achieve economic growth in the 21st century, rapid
adoption and mastery of technology is paramount (Rodan, 2000b).
Statistically, the use of IT in Singapore is most impressive,
especially for a population numbering less than 4 million.
According to a survey of 1,500 Singaporean households carried
out by the IDA in 2000, 66% of the population are knowledgeable
on the use of personal computers, 61% of households have at least
one computer, while 50% of homes are connected to the Internet in
one form or another (IDA, 2001). This suggests that Singapore is
more connected than developed countries like the United States
(42%), Australia (37%) and Britain (35%) (Dawson, 2001a). The
survey also found Singapore to be an ‘e-inclusive’ society, with
strong personal computer ownership and Internet access across
Malay, Indian and Chinese – the three main races in multiracial
Singapore – households (Dawson, 2001b). In September 2001,
mobile telephony penetration rate in Singapore reached 76.7%, with
a broadband audience exceeding 400,000 and rising exponentially
(IDA 2001).
A 2002 monograph published by the Singapore Internet Project
(SIP) Team on Internet in Singapore reaffirms Singapore’s high level
of IT use, with about 46% of adults, age 18 and above, active users
of the Internet. The number is markedly higher for Singaporean
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students, who are increasingly being IT-trained and exposed from
day one, with Internet penetration at 71% and rising (Kuo. et al,
2002: 100).  Even ‘non-users’ – defined in the report as people
who do not access the Internet due to three key reasons: did not
know how, no time and no interest – were found to be generally
supportive of Internet use and development.
But in order to understand the significance of the SIP study,
the notion of ‘Internet use’ needs to be put into perspective. The
SIP team identifies the two main purposes of the Internet as “a
source of information and as a tool for communication” (Kuo, et
al, 2002: 8). The researchers found that emails and information
search were by far the most popular Internet activities, followed
by entertainment and online discussions. E-commerce activities,
marked by online shopping and browsing for goods and services,
were not popular due largely to concerns about security and
privacy of information (Kuo, et al, 2002: 103-4). Closer analysis of
these figures suggests, among other things, that the depth of
technological know-how in Singapore remains fairly low.
Although usage is relatively high, Internet ‘expertise’ is limited
to emailing and other elementary personal and commercial
functions. Sophisticated use comes in mainly at the ‘youth market’
level, with downloading of music, movies, graphics, online
gaming and other multi-media tools the key applications.
The slow take-up of basic e-commerce activities by
Singaporeans contradicts the expressed goal of the government
for Singaporeans to embrace new technologies. This anomaly can
be explained by looking at another aspect of the SIP report: the
perception that the Internet has not led to a stronger sense of
political empowerment (Kuo, et al, 2002: 111). According to the
researchers, the percentages of users who believe that the Internet
enables increased engagement on government policies and
political issues are low (at less than 20%). This dismal result
suggests that there is little hope for political change to be effected
by harnessing new communication technologies within the
confines of Singapore. Yet if one considers the global potential of
the Internet and the fact that the Internet is often the first port of
call when seeking uncontrolled and ‘truthful’ information, it
would be too simplistic to write off the political possibilities of
the Internet in Singapore (Gomez, 2002). After all, the Internet is,
by design and by the many codes and regulatory guidelines,
always-already a site of struggle and contestation. The next section
of this paper continues along this thread by looking at how the
Internet has been regulated in Singapore since its inception. It
also considers how Foucault’s mode of governmentality via
‘tactics’ of regulation – what I have termed ‘auto-regulation’ (Lee,9 AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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2001a,b,c) – has been applied on the Internet and other new media
technologies in Singapore (Foucault, 1977; 1978). By looking at the
different responses to auto-regulation, we may understand how new
communication technologies can be used – and abused – for social
and political ends.
[T]he major effect of the “Panopticon” [is] to induce in the
inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures
the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the
surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous
in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its
actual exercise unnecessary. […] It is an important mechanism, for
it automizes and disindividualizes power (Foucault, 1977:201-2).
In recent years, the Singapore government has been actively
promoting the attributes of creativity and innovation. The firm belief
is that Singapore’s future prosperity is tied to its success applying
artistic creativity and scientific innovation in various entrepreneurial
goals (MITA, 2000), most prominently seen in the government’s
aggressive attempts at turning Singapore into a biomedical hub as
well as the nurturing of the arts and culture into ‘creative industries’
(Creative Industries Working Group, 2002). There are concerns,
however, that an over-emphasis on a rigid and structured education
system, along with a hitherto intolerant social, cultural and political
censorship regime, has stifled the creativity and risk-taking
initiatives of Singaporeans. At his annual National Rally Speech in
2002, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong signalled a possible directional
change when he expressed a desire for various locales in Singapore
to evolve into “little Bohemias” where people can “gather, soak in
the ambience, and do their creative stuff” (Goh, 2002). Whilst the
efforts are real, with the recent completion of Singapore’s new world-
class arts venue, ‘Esplanade - Theatres By the Bay’, a commanding
proof of the government’s commitment towards enhancing
creativity, its long-term effectiveness remains questionable (Banks,
2002a: 3; Ong, 2002). Not least due to the fact that many of the tried-
and-tested rules and regulations, often accompanied by harsh
penalties, remain intact.
In April 2002, the Censorship Review Committee was re-
convened by Acting Minister for Information, Communication and
the Arts David Lim, to ‘update’ and ‘refresh’ censorship policies
(Koh, 2002: 3; Tan, 2002). Minister Lim summarises the crux of the
matter when he makes clear that “Singapore needs to be more
playful, but that doesn’t mean we’re going to be naughty” (in Koh,
2002: 3). Minister Lim’s remark bears deep semblance to a commonly
quoted phrase articulated by his predecessor Minister George Yeo:
Internet
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“Leave the windows open, but carry fly-swatters,” which cautions
Singaporeans who may mistakenly conclude that a loosening of
cultural censorship implies socio-political liberty (cited in Lee &
Birch, 2000: 164). While it appears – with this latest declaration –
that not much will change in the short to medium term, censorship
reviewers will be forced to consider the impact that the Internet
has made to cultural norms in Singapore. As Banks (2002a: 3)
articulates (in the context of the current censorship review):
“It remains to be seen whether the review is simply a
recognition that the Internet now makes it extremely difficult for
governments to regulate what its people read, see and hear and
therefore need some tinkering – or is a genuine attempt to liberalise
the law.”
Certainly, there will be ‘some tinkering’ to censorship rules
in the near future, but the extent to which is unlikely to be seen as
‘liberal’ in the true sense of the word. One needs to remember
that censorship in Singapore is predicated upon the ‘symbolic’,
that is, it signifies and affirms community values and political
tolerance in Singapore (Lee & Birch, 2000: 150-1).   Any attempt to
liberalise censorship rules is likely to find widespread resistance
in a society that professes moral and cultural conservatism, often
to the point of emasculation (Banks, 2001: 5). This gives the
authorities in Singapore a legitimate right to exercise ‘thought’
control, whether this is found in the management of ‘sleazy’
material and other undesirable practices or in the clamping down
of oppositional political voices.
What most Singaporeans do not seem to realise is that in a
climate of auto-regulation, where regulation is carried out
‘automatically’, both overtly and subtly at the same time, the
preference to err on the conservative side gives the government
and its statutory bodies immense power to craft new rules, laws
and codes to tighten its already tremendous grip on social, cultural,
ideological and political power (Lee, 2001c). Prominent
Singaporean journalist Cherian George calls this consolidated
power ‘central control’ (George, 2000; see also Ellis, 2001).
Veritably, with auto-regulation, the government becomes the
supervisory ‘central tower’ in Bentham’s Panopticon, a privileged
position from which to exercise surveillance on citizens as
‘inmates’ (Foucault, 1977).
The notion of ‘auto-regulation’ embodies the key elements
of the Panopticon in that one does not know when the ‘supervisor’,
as the extension of the authorities, is really watching.  As a result,
regulation appears to be carried out automatically and with
machine-like precision. As Foucault (1977: 201) puts it, “[the]11 AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
TERENCE LEE:  New regulatory politics ...
architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and
sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises
it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation
of which they are themselves the bearers.”
In other words, auto-regulation works because it is a potent
combination of all possible modes of regulation: application of
legislations and regulations, state surveillance, direct policing, self-
regulation, and so on. With modern technology, auto-regulation can
be ‘automised’ and applied with even greater precision and subtlety
(Foucault, 1977: 202).
Singapore’s approach to managing the Internet has become in
many ways an epitome of auto-regulation. As Gomez points out,
political control through Internet monitoring is technically easier
due to the ability to intercept electronic communication messages
at the point of departure or reception (2002: 43). In Singapore, the
fact that all local Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and broadband
service providers are either government-owned or government-
linked makes the business of electronic eavesdropping child’s play.
Indeed, one of the most pertinent points of auto-regulation in
Singapore is that no new technology escapes the watchful eyes of
the state police.
Even Singapore’s official Internet content policy embodies
aspects of auto-regulation. The Singapore Broadcasting Authority
(SBA) is empowered by its Act of 1995 to regulate Internet content.
SBA’s Internet policy comprises a set of Industry Guidelines on the
Singapore Broadcasting Authority’s Internet Policy (October 1997),
an Internet Code of Practice (November 1997) and a Class Licence
scheme (July 1996). These codes and guidelines combine to form
the overall practice of Internet self-regulation in Singapore (Lee,
2001a,b,c). The Industry Guidelines explains the main features of
SBA’s Internet regulatory policies and spells the rules for ISPs as
well as Internet Content Providers (ICPs). Although the Internet
Code of Practice is highlighted within the Industry Guidelines, it is
essentially a separate document specifying details of ‘dos and
don’ts’. In this document, ‘prohibited material’ is broadly defined
as: “material that is objectionable on the grounds of public interest,
public morality, public order, public security, national harmony, or
is otherwise prohibited by applicable Singapore laws” (SBA, 1997b,
item 4 [1] ).
The obvious problem with this ‘definition’ is that is leaves too
much room for (mis)interpretation. What at any time constitutes
‘public’ or ‘public interest’ is not – and probably can never be –
clearly construed. As many critics have pointed out, policy and/or
political terms in Singapore are not transparent (see Rodan, 2000a;12 AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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Lee & Birch, 2000; Yao, 1996). The deliberate employment of
ambiguous and arbitrary legal terms, interpretable only by state
officials, is one of the key foundations of auto-regulation.  A blanket
Class Licence scheme is then applied to all ISPs and ICPs so that
all who put up any content on the web are ‘automatically’ licensed
without the need to actually apply for one. The only exception is
that any website seeking to promote political or religious causes
must pre-register. Up to 2001, the political aspect of the Class
Licence scheme was rarely invoked.
In July 2001, notice was issued to the popular Sintercom (which
stands for ‘Singapore Internet Community’) website to register
itself as an Internet site “engaged in the propagation, promotion
or discussion of political issues relating to Singapore on the
Internet” (Goh, 2001). At that time, this move was seen by critics
as bizarre given that the independent website, founded in 1994
and perceived by many as the beacon of civil society in Singapore,
had been previously exempted. Up to July 2001, Sintercom had
been one of the most innovative non-governmental website, set
up to encourage candid discussions of social, cultural and political
life in Singapore for local and overseas Singaporeans. A month
later, Tan Chong Kee, founder of Sintercom, announced that the
website was to shut in end-August 2001. Tan put the blame
squarely on the arbitrariness of political terms within the Class
Licence policy, adding that he believed civil society to be a ‘lost
cause’ in Singapore (Tan, 2001; Lee, 2002). Although Tan stressed
that his decision had nothing to do with Sintercom’s regulatory
tussle with the authorities, it is apparent that SBA’s Internet auto-
regulatory framework has succeeded in crippling alternative and
oppositional discourses. The automatic licensing approach of
SBA’s Class Licence policy instills a panoptic sense of power and
fear, thus minimising the need for supervision or direct
intimidation.
To date, Singapore’s Internet industry players have not flouted
any of SBA’s Internet guidelines. While SBA claims that this is
due to its transparent policies, it is apparent that the fine record of
policy adherence owes a great deal to the application of auto-
regulation at various times in Singapore’s brief history of the
Internet. In 1994, the year when public Internet access was first
made available through SingNet  (the ISP arm of local
telecommunications conglomerate SingTel), at least two
unauthorised scans – according to official explanations, to source
for unlawful pornographic materials and viruses – were conducted
on private users’ email accounts. In November 1998, the local
Straits Times daily reported that a section of the Singapore Police
Force was set up to ‘patrol the alleys of cyberspace’ so as to keep13 AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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hackers and cyber-criminals at bay. And again in April 1999, SingNet
was found to be conducting unauthorised scanning of its
subscribers’ web accounts, supposedly for deadly viruses. This latter
case made the front-page news because the Ministry of Home
Affairs, the parent ministry of the Singapore Police Force, was
involved. SingNet had to issue a public apology – not on paper, but
via mass e-mail (Lee, 2001a,b; Rodan, 2000a).
Perhaps the most significant auto-regulatory tactic employed
by the SBA since October 1997 – in conjunction with the unveiling
of the aforementioned Internet Code of Practice – is the censoring
of 100 pornographic sites via proxy servers of the three main ISPs
operating in Singapore: SingNet, Pacific Internet and Starhub, all with
deep government links (Lee & Birch, 2000). SBA’s rationale for
censoring these 100 smut sites is to exhibit a gesture of pastoral
concern for the moral values of Singaporeans (Tan, 1997: 27). This
strategy of ‘gestural censorship’ exemplifies auto-regulation par
excellence as it works to not only draw public attention to its new
guidelines, it also: “reaffirm[s] the means by which the government
of Singapore is able to enact the ideology of … social control of the
public sphere, demonstrating the means by which the habitus of
controlled behaviour is still reinforced and able to be reinforced in
Singapore” (Lee & Birch, 2000: 149).
The ability to block websites gives the impression that electronic
‘snooping’ is being performed by the authorities, so it becomes
necessary for citizens to toe the official line by self-censoring
(Gomez, 2000). Although SBA has repeatedly stated that it does not
conduct online monitoring (see Lim, 2001), the fact that significant
public attention were given to the scanning incidents – or ‘scan-
dals’, as I have called them (Lee, 2001c) – are sufficient to warn
users about the widespread power of auto-regulation. Whether or
not actual file searching or surveillance is carried out becomes
irrelevant in an auto-regulatory climate, the demonstration of a
government’s technical capability is far more potent and
intimidating. Auto-regulation thus hinges on an ideology of control
and surveillance with the sole aim of producing law-abiding, self-
regulated and therefore, useful citizens – what Foucault refers to as
‘docile bodies’ (Foucault, 1977).
SBA has repeatedly emphasised that its Internet policy has been
developed in consultation with the media and info-communications
industry. This does not, however, negate dominant perceptions that
a panoptic mode of surveillance continues to dominate in Singapore
– if not physically, then ideologically. Auto-regulation works because
the enclosed nature of a panoptic regulatory supervision “does not
preclude a permanent presence from the outside” (Foucault, 1977:14 AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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207).  As Foucault points out, the general public is always welcome
to inspect the central Panopticon tower by scrutinising the
guidelines/codes (by downloading them from E-Citizen or
government websites) or by examining other functions of
surveillance (by visiting and/or speaking to the authorities). But
because auto-regulation is a widely dispersed function, with each
individual playing a vital role – in self-regulation, self-censorship
and the condoning or acceptance of rules that appear to promote
public orderliness – it is almost impossible to find fault with it. As
a consequence, the authorities can claim to be objective,
consultative and transparent. The auto-regulatory role of
surveillance and policing thus strengthens rather than weakens.
Auto-regulation, like the Panopticon, becomes as Foucault notes:
“a transparent building in which the exercise of power may be
supervised by society as a whole” (Foucault, 1977: 207). What this
also means is that the authorities are increasingly able to pre-empt
and tighten the strictures of political control of new communication
technologies in Singapore.
Singaporean gatekeepers have long been wary – even
paranoid – of foreign media and international broadcasters
engaging in Singapore’s domestic politics (The Straits Times
Interactive, 10 March 2001; see also Seow, 1998). This fear has been
the driving force of foreign media censorship since the 1960s.  In
July 1986, the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA), the
key legislation governing publications in Singapore, was amended
to enable the government to restrict sales of foreign publications
deemed to be interfering with Singapore politics. Following the
passage of this law, many foreign media were taken to task for
their reports of unsavoury aspects of the PAP system (Chee, 2001:
173). Foreign publications falling victim to this new law included
the Far Eastern Economic Review, The Economist, The Asian Wall Street
Journal and Asiaweek (Seow, 1998: 148). In addition, in the past 30
years, global media players including Newsweek, Reuters, The Times
(London), The Star (Malaysia), Time, and International Herald Tribune
have had their editors and/or journalists hauled to court and sued
heavily for publishing defamatory or libellous articles (Seow, 1998;
Chee, 2001).
The muzzling of the foreign media was extended to the global
broadcast media in April 2001. After a very brief debate in a one-
party dominated Parliament, the Singapore Broadcasting
Authority (Amendment) Bill 2001 was passed. Under this
legislation, foreign broadcasters which meddle in ‘domestic
politics’ – a term that only the Minister of Information,
New
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Communication and the Arts is empowered by law to define – could
be slapped with restrictions on the number of households which
can receive their broadcasts through cable (operated by SCV); or
worse, the broadcast channel could be ‘blacked-out’ altogether (The
Straits Times Interactive, 23 April 2001). If such an action is effected,
advertising and/or subscription revenue of the affected broadcaster
will be severely affected. In his parliamentary speech on the new
Bill, then Minister of Information and the Arts Lee Yock Suan
revealed the Singapore government’s clear grasp of the business of
the media industry:
“This Bill makes it clear to foreign broadcasters that while they
can sell their services to Singaporeans, they should not interfere with
our domestic politics” (Lee, cited in Latif, 2001).
Indeed, the touchstone of all commercial media is the market
and as such any decision on regulatory compliance would thus be
market-dictated and targeted. Undoubtedly, Singaporean law and
policy-makers understand – and apply – this knowledge only too
well. As journalist Eric Ellis of The Australian notes more cogently:
“Where [global media players] are all vulnerable to Singapore
[laws and] justice is that each has an economic interest in Singapore
itself. The city-state might have a tiny population but it is a wealthy,
English-speaking one. Foreign titles print in Singapore because it
guarantees efficiency. So, if the Government chooses, as it has done,
to cut Singapore circulation, advertising and profits are threatened”
(Ellis, 2002: 9).
The government further demonstrated its auto-regulatory
abilities in the new media arena by tackling an online publication in
August 2002. On 4 August 2002, the international news agency
Bloomberg published an article by its US-based columnist Patrick
Smith that described as nepotism the appointment of Senior Minister
Lee Kuan Yew’s daughter-in-law, Ho Ching, as Executive Director
of Temasek Holdings, the powerful government-owned corporation
that controls most of the government-linked companies in Singapore
(Ellis, 2002: 9; The Straits Times Interactive, 30 August 2002). This article
was published electronically on Bloomberg’s website and terminals,
and appeared in print only in Malaysia’s The New Sunday Times on
11 August 2002. Upon knowledge of a possible defamation suit,
Bloomberg  retracted its article, apologised unreservedly to the Senior
Minister, the Prime Minister as well as his Deputy Lee Hsien Loong,
and offered damages amounting to S$595,000. The apology and
compensation was accepted and the case was settled in three weeks.
Bloomberg’s  quick settlement demonstrated a pragmatic
understanding of political constraints of both media operations and
Internet use in Singapore, and that the Singaporean authorities have16 AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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no intention of relinquishing its auto-regulatory control in the
digital era. If anything, one is likely to see a further fine-tuning of
rules and regulations.
Commentators and critics on Singapore have variously argued
that the real intention of restricting access to websites is ideological,
a term used broadly to imply that the agenda is always political.
On 8 June 2001, whilst launching the official website of the ruling
People’s Action Party (PAP), Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien
Loong announced that new regulations on how political parties
may use the Internet at election time would be unveiled (Chua,
2001a: 3). It is interesting to note how the PAP government, being
one of the most vociferous proponents of IT and the info-
communications industry, had taken such a long time to show its
‘electronic face’ (see Chua, 2001b: 12). This ‘face’, however, is
somewhat limited as the website is essentially an exercise in public
relations, featuring interviews with party leaders, most of whom,
as cabinet members, receive sufficient local media coverage
anyway. Gomez argues that absence of a discussion forum, along
with the disclaimers found in the ‘Conditions of Access’ page on
the PAP website, reveals the inherent anxiety of the PAP leaders
to be “out in the open and in an interactive domain policed by the
very laws that it has introduced” (Gomez, 2002: 28). But for a party
that has dominant control of the apparatuses of government, such
rules can be easily circumvented or revamped to its advantage.
On 13 August 2001, in clear preparation for the 2001 General
Elections held on 3 November 2001, the Singapore Parliament
passed an amendment to the Parliamentary Elections Act to
regulate Internet campaigning and advertising during election
time. The new Bill is essentially an extension and refinement of
SBA’s Class Licence scheme. Instead of leaving content providers
to self-regulate, the Parliamentary Elections Act defines specifically
what is allowed on political party as well as non-partisan political
websites that are already registered with SBA. As a pre-emptive
measure, even new communication tools like mobile telephones,
along with data and text functions like short messaging services
(SMS), came under the purview of this new law.
According to Minister Lee Yock Suan, the Act is to “keep
political campaigning serious and responsible,” and it is to be
perceived as a positive step forward in terms of “liberalising the
use of Internet” and communication technologies for political
advertising (Ng, 2001; Editorial, 2001; Lim, 2001). Typically, terms
such as ‘liberalising’ and ‘political’ remain equivocal, but
nonetheless constraining. The ambiguity of such laws are likely
to prompt oppositional political figures as well as non-political17 AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
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activists to auto-regulate their online as well as offline activities.
What is most baffling is that the law was passed with the complete
set of rules still in a work-in-progress stage. The Minister did
however ‘assure’ the House that the full list of Internet features which
would be allowed on these websites would be released before the
election (The Straits Times Interactive, 14 August 2001).
The rules were unveiled and subsequently made effective on
17 October 2001, about two weeks before polling day. Opposition
political parties, most of which are already under-staffed and short-
handed, had to make the necessary adjustments to their websites
within the short time frame, whilst having to campaign and canvass
for votes. As Rodan (2001: 26) observes, “Political competition in
Singapore operates within tight strictures. Periodic refinements are
meant to keep it that way and take the risk out of elections for the
ruling People’s Action Party (PAP). […] Adjustments include fine-
tuning controls over electronic media. The PAP is accustomed to
conducting election campaigns with media that promotes rather than
question or scrutinise its message. That is not about to dramatically
change.”
If Rodan’s words portend the future of politics in Singapore,
what hope is there for genuine opposition to arise in Singapore?
The work of Singaporean activist James Gomez – most conspicuously
in the setting up of Think Centre, founded as a news events and
publishing company devoted to raising awareness on political
reform within Singapore and the region – suggests that there are yet
frontiers of the Internet to exploit for the purposes of engaging
Singaporeans (Gomez, 2000; see especially Chapter 1). Using the
Internet to organise activities on the ground and openly publicising
correspondences with the authorities, the Think Centre fast-
forwarded ‘e-politics’ in Singapore in the sense that the authorities
had less room to err in its decision and policy making processes.
Accordingly in October 2001, the Think Centre was gazetted as a
political society, with funding and other restrictions placed upon it.
In his revealing book on Internet Politics in Singapore, Gomez (2002:
92) remains somewhat optimistic when he notes that: “Internet
legislation in Singapore to date stands to cover websites and for
election time covers political parties and organisations. It does not
yet cover individuals and there has been no instance for the PAP to
move against an individual.”
If Gomez’s intention was to alert individuals about the
possible risk of overstepping political boundaries in private Internet
postings, his response came shortly after. In July 2002, the police
embarked on a criminal defamation investigation on Zulfikar
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activist website <www.fateha.com> who took the government to
task in early 2002 on the rights of Muslim girls to wear their tudung
(traditional headscarves) to schools. This racial cum religious
encounter was particularly sensitive in the wake of the terror
attacks on 11 September 2001 and the uncovering of the Jemaah
Islamiah terrorist plot in Singapore in January 2002, but the
investigation had a lot more to do with political annoyance than
with social threat. As The Straits Times reported on 4 July 2002,
Zulkifar was being investigated for three articles posted on the
website questioning Muslim Affairs Minister Yaacob Ibrahim’s
standing as leader of the Malay/Muslim community and
criticising Ho Ching’s appointment as Executive Director of
Temasek Holdings (as in the case of Bloomberg)  (Osman, 2002a).
The probes intensified the next day when the police impounded
the computer of another man, Robert Ho, for two articles that
appeared in June in soc.culture.singapore, a popular Internet
newsgroup, that may have also criminally defamed government
leaders and officials (Osman, 2002b).
Through this brief episode, the principle of auto-regulation
was applied very swiftly, effectively warning would-be online
offenders to watch their cyber-journeys and to avoid dabbling in
political issues. Tan Tarn How, a veteran Straits Times journalist
‘closed’ the saga with a seemingly innocuous report that the
Internet community was ‘spooked’ by these events, “with some
users wondering if they would be targeted next” (Tan, 2002). The
fear of falling victim to the widening electronic powers of the
Singaporean authorities meant that individuals no longer had
much laxity in the use of the Internet and other new media tools.
Veritably, the task and function of auto-regulation is being rolled-
out as rapidly as the uptake of new media technologies over the
past decade. As the final section will suggest, the fast-developing
array of electronic government (e-Government) services,
exemplified more prominently by Singapore’s e-Citizen portal
website may set the scene for the restriction or gradual erosion of
individual civil liberties along with political involvement and
participation.
The Singapore government’s next phase of Internet
development comes in the form of an electronic-government (e-
Government) vision. Globally, the concept of E-Government
appeared in the 1990s, but was put into practice only at the turn
of the new millennium. E-Government was widely heralded as a
tool that would bring about greater democracy with the
enhancement of political participation and the ability of citizens
E-Governing
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to vote online. Even so, most e-Government projects around the
world are intended primarily to facilitate citizens’ access to a great
amount of diverse information put forth by government
departments. Indeed, for the public, e-government means a
simplification of their interaction with government via Internet
connectivity; or in other words, a new way of governance
(Netchaeva, 2002: 467).
In June 2000, the Singapore government made public its
adoption of this new governance strategy when it announced a
three-year S$1.5 billion E-Government Action Plan which seeks to
“develop thought leadership on e-government; build new
capabilities and new capacities; encourage the spread of electronic
service delivery; innovate with info-comm[unication] technologies;
and finally be responsive and proactive” (IDA, 2001: 36).
This cryptically crafted Action Plan effectively requires all civil
servants and government administrators to fundamentally rethink
all aspects of governance and consider how technology can be used
to improve internal efficiency and improve governmental
interaction with individuals and businesses (IDA, 2000: 36). The
ability of any government to move towards e-Government,
according to Norris (2001), is partly a demonstration of its
technological prowess and partly a fine-tuning of its ability to meet
the administrative needs of citizens. In this regard, Singapore has
received numerous accolades for its impressive implementation of
government services online. For example, in June 2002, Singapore
was presented an Explorer Award in recognition of its innovative
online public programmes by the prestigious E-Gov organisation
based in the United States (The Straits Times Interactive, 26 June 2002).
In addition, Singapore has been recognised for being the second
most mature e-government location in a worldwide study done by
consulting firm Accenture (IDA, 2001: 36).
At present, Singapore’s E-Citizen portal, <www.ecitizen.gov.sg>,
provides the best illustration of Singapore’s successes in e-
Government. Launched in April 1999, the e-Citizen website offers
more than 180 e-services grouped in 16 online units based on
categories that address family life, health, housing, education,
employment, transport and other day to day issues (IDA, 2001).  In
2001, close to one-third of Singaporean taxpayers filed their income
tax returns online, a figure that is reportedly one of the highest in
the world. By the end of 2002, about 95 per cent of all official services
are expected to be available via eCitizen (Dawson, 2002).
According to the IDA, the aim is to streamline administration
such that citizens would not need to visit government offices at all
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million hits a month, which works out to about one in two persons
using e-Government services in Singapore (Dawson, 2002). The
Singapore government is also actively developing a nationwide
electronic business transaction system known as the ‘Government
Electronic Business’ (GeBiz). When operational, GeBiz will link
all government departments with its suppliers, thus streamlining
the often-cumbersome processes of issuing purchase orders,
tendering and procurement of goods and services (IDA, 2000,2001).
It is noteworthy that the IDA, the main driver of e-Government
in Singapore, has termed the entire electronic project a democratic
aspiration towards a “citizen-friendly state” (IDA, 2000). Whilst
the ability to carry out necessary bureaucratic tasks and to access
comprehensive information about government policies, white
papers, official reports and other abstruse documents are moves
towards greater transparency, one needs to consider the
implications of auto-regulation in an increasingly networked
environment. Clearly, electronic linkage of citizens to government
offices would enable greater direct scrutiny, thus a (further) loss of
privacy along with surveillance that is more precise than ever
before. In addition, a truly representative democracy requires not
just information, but also a two-way communication process at
regular intervals, beyond mere election time (Norris, 2001: 129-
30). In short, the ‘citizen-friendly state’ envisaged by the
government has a greater potential to marginalise rather than
engage people. As Norris (2001: 130) articulates:
“E-governance is open to criticism that [government] agencies
have been more willing to carry out traditional functions via
electronic means, rather than using digital technologies to reinvent
how they conduct business, to reconnect with citizens as customers,
and to strengthen public participation in government.”
It is debatable whether greater public participation is the
primary or ultimate goal of the Singapore government. After all,
the government has always clung onto the belief that control must
precede openness and transparency, and that any participation in
political life must be done within the geopolitical arena of
Parliament (see Lee, 2002). Although the Singaporean authorities
have embraced e-Government in a seemingly enlightened manner,
the principles of auto-regulation remains fully enforced.
Government-endorsed channels of communication, most notably
the Feedback Unit within the Prime Minister’s Office, have tended
to steer clear of the Internet. Even the forging of links with
Singaporeans residing overseas, managed by quasi-government
organisations such as the Singapore International Foundation (SIF),
are often carried out physically rather than electronically. Prior to21 AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
TERENCE LEE:  New regulatory politics ...
a recent online discussion session with Minister David Lim on 16
October 2002, the SIF issued an email news release explaining that
“online chats provide an important channel for the Singapore
government and political leaders to explain and elaborate policies
and plans for the Singapore populace, [and to] gain immediate
feedback” (Singapore International Foundation, 2002).
As the world moves towards global online exchange and e-
commerce, it is certain that more rules will be enacted to guard
against uses and abuses of the Internet and other new media
technologies. With fears of terrorism caused by the events of 11
September 2001, as well as online sabotages in various forms, an
increased threat to global security is likely to enhance the regulatory
role of authorities around the world. On 29 September 2001, the
Singapore Government reversed its decision to allow overseas
Singaporeans to vote at limited centres globally, despite an earlier
amendment to the Parliamentary Elections Act which would have
allowed the first-ever overseas voting, due to security concerns in
the aftermath of the terror attacks (Fernandez, 2001).  Critics saw
this as a political tactic aimed at minimising the possibility of voters’
backlash during uncertain times. But more importantly, this incident
provided a case in point of how democracy can weaken rather than
strengthen with advancements in technology, considering how
overseas voting was to be a first of several steps towards the setting
up of electronic voting facilities within Singapore and abroad.
The government’s ambivalence towards the Internet and new
communication technologies is reflective of the political tactic and
strategy of auto-regulation.  It is, for one, blatant yet subtle; it is
open yet surreptitious. It promotes strong economic growth whilst
keeping social and political dissent at bay. It appears to embrace
technological development, whilst making sure that its control over
technology remains watertight. With the gradual and further
tightening of political rules and legislations governing media and
communications, the policing discourse of auto-regulation looks
set to intensify as Singapore and the rest of the world move towards
e-commerce and e-government. As Foucault puts it, “surveillance
is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action”
(Foucault, 1977: 201).
For the time being, there are yet possibilities via the Internet –
although somewhat limited due to a refinement and enactment of
new rules every now and again – to engage citizens and to challenge
the social, cultural and political status quo, whether individually
or collectively. There is no doubt, however, that an auto-regulated
application of political expedience in the way electronic spaces are
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used today will have significant ramifications on the political and
technological future of Singapore. How this future pans out would
depend largely on the extent to which the government is prepared
to review its role as arbiter in and of all issues, as well as the extent
to which Singaporeans are prepared to embrace the causes of socio-
political justice – not for economic or political gains, but for its
own sake. Both scenarios, I suspect, would take a fair amount of
time to materialise, if at all.
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